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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 19-2451 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                                           
 
v. 
 
JARED MARC BROWN, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 4-17-cr-00262-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 14, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 29, 2020) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
 
 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
For the reason stated below, we will affirm the District Court’s sentencing of 
Appellant Jared Marc Brown.  The District Court did not err in denying Brown a two-
level reduction under § 3E1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) for 
acceptance of responsibility.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Brown has threatened to kill various presidents of the United States more than 
once.  While serving a supervised release revocation sentence related to a 2015 
conviction for threatening to kill former-President Barack Obama, Brown again 
threatened former-President Obama, in addition to threatening to kill President Donald 
Trump and a Secret Service agent.  He also threatened to blow up the prison where he 
was serving his sentence.  During an interview with Secret Service agents, Brown 
admitted to making all of these threats, and though he retracted his threat against former-
President Obama, he refused to retract the threats against President Trump and the Secret 
Service agent.   
A grand jury indicted Brown for knowingly and willfully making a threat to the 
life of the President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871.  After being 
deemed incompetent to assist properly in his defense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), 
Brown received treatment, and in February 2019, the District Court determined that he 
had “recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him[.]”  App. 21.  A plea offer was then 
extended to Brown by the Government, though it was ultimately withdrawn by the 
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Government once signed by Brown because, in March 2019, during plea negotiations, 
Brown engaged in significant misconduct, including but not limited to an incident where 
he again threatened President Trump’s life.  At that time, he also threatened the lives of a 
United States District Court judge, the judge’s spouse, and another federal agent.  After 
having his plea deal withdrawn, Brown requested a consolidated plea and sentencing 
hearing, which was granted.  During the consolidated plea and sentencing hearing, the 
District Court determined Brown was competent to plead guilty, accepted Brown’s 
unconditional guilty plea, and sentenced Brown to 42 months’ imprisonment and a $100 
assessment.1  However, at sentencing, Brown disputed whether the District Court erred in 
denying him credit for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines.  
Brown filed a timely notice of appeal.  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “We review factual findings 
underlying [a district court’s] denial of a Sentencing Guidelines reduction for acceptance 
of responsibility for clear error, and reverse only if we are left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 
199 (3d Cir. 2007).  The sentencing judge’s determination is “entitled to great deference 
on review,” as the “judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of 
                                                          
1 The Guidelines estimate provided by the probation office put the sentencing 
range between 57 to 60 months’ imprisonment.   
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responsibility.”  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.5; see also United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 
126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996).   
III. ANALYSIS 
When a defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his 
offense[,] [he] is entitled to a [two]-level reduction to his calculated offense level” under 
the Guidelines § 3E1.1(a).  United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  However, a defendant’s ability to obtain the 
reduction is potentially negated—per the sentencing judge’s discretion—when the 
defendant continues to engage in criminal activity after the defendant’s purported 
acceptance of responsibility.  See, e.g., Ceccarani, 98 F.3d at 130 (“Continual criminal 
activity, even differing in nature from the convicted offense, is inconsistent with an 
acceptance of responsibility and an interest in rehabilitation.”).  
The District Court ruled that Brown was not entitled to the two-level reduction, 
listing four incidents of misconduct that occurred after he was indicted that were similar 
in nature to his charged offenses.  This included an incident occurring after the District 
Court deemed Brown competent, in which Brown threated to kill President Trump, as 
well as a federal judge, the judge’s wife, and a federal agent.  The incidents recounted by 
the sentencing judge are thus sufficient to negate Brown’s prior acceptance of 
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responsibility, as they reflect continued criminal activity.2  As such, the denial of the two-
level reduction was not clearly erroneous.3   
IV. CONCLUSION 
The District Court did not commit clear error in denying Brown a two-level 
decrease under the Guidelines § 3E1.1.  As such, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment of conviction. 
                                                          
2 Contrary to Brown’s suggestion, at sentencing, the judge did not impose a 
sentence on the basis of conduct that occurred while Brown was incompetent.  Rather, at 
sentencing, the judge specifically highlighted misconduct committed by Brown when he 
was deemed competent.  While Brown was deemed competent to stand trial on February 
21, 2019, a forensic psychology report was sent to the Court in early January stating that 
Brown was competent.  As such, any conduct that occurred on or after January 4, 2019—
for example, a January 27, 2019 incident, and threats made on March 25, 2019 (examples 
referenced by the judge)—was conduct that occurred when Brown had been deemed 
competent.   
 
3 Additionally, we note, that while the District Court did not grant the two-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, it nevertheless considered Brown’s acceptance 
as a mitigating factor in sentencing, rendering a sentence below the low-end of the 
Guidelines range (a 42-month sentence with a 57-60 month Guidelines range).   
